Abstract: Currently, string theory represents the only advanced approach to a unication of all interactions, including gravity. In spite of the more than thirty years of its existence, the sequence of metamorphosis it ran through, and the ever more increasing number of involved physicists, until now, it did not make any empirically testable predictions. Because there are no empirical data incompatible with the quantum eld theoretical standard model of elementary particle physics and with general relativity, the only motivations for string theory rest in the mutual incompatibility of the standard model and of general relativity as well as in the metaphysics of the unication program of physics, aimed at a nal unied theory of all interactions including gravity. But actually, it is completely unknown which physically interpretable principles could form the basis of string theory. At the moment, string theory is no theory at all, but rather a labyrinthic structure of mathematical procedures and intuitions which get their justication from the fact that they, at least formally, reproduce general relativity and the standard model of elementary particle physics as low energy approximations. However, there are now strong indications that string theory does not only reproduce the dynamics and symmetries of our standard model, but a plethora of dierent scenarios with dierent low energy nomologies and symmetries. String theory seems to describe not only our world, but an immense landscape of possible worlds. So far, all attempts to nd a selection principle which could be motivated intratheoretically remained without success. So, recently the idea that the low energy nomology of our world, and therefore also the observable phenomenology, could be the result of an anthropic selection from a vast arena of nomologically dierent scenarios entered string theory. Although multiverse scenarios and anthropic selection are not only motivated by string theory, but lead also to a possible exReiner Hedrich: String Theory From Physics to Metaphysics planation for the ne tuning of the universe, they are concepts which transcend the framework dened by the epistemological and methodological rules which conventionally form the basis of physics as an empirical science.
However, all systems of nature, without any exception, are subject to gravity; and as soon as we think of all systems of nature as quantum systems, the incompatibility of quantum mechanics and general relativity is a fundamental problem.
It may be true that we can ignore this problem for many microscopic as well as for many macroscopic systems: for electrons, gravity can generally be considered as irrelevant, as well as quantum eects can be ignored for planets. But for black holes and for the assumed high-density state of matter at the beginning of cosmic expansion the problem gets virulent. Here the areas of relevance of the two incompatible theoretical constructs which presently form our most advanced and most fundamental apparatus of physics are overlapping. Gravitational as well as quantum eects are crucially relevant. Neither general relativity nor quantum eld theory alone is sucient for the description of the physical phenomena in this overlap area.
3 quantize gravity -in general relativity identied with the metrics of dynamical Riemannian geometry -on the at, static Minkowski background spacetime of quantum eld theory. Such a procedure will certainly not lead to the desired result. The idea of a quantization of dynamical spacetime (gravity) on the static background spacetime of quantum eld theory means simply a conceptual contradiction.
3 So, for example, the formation of black holes can be understood, at least partially, within the context of general relativity. According to general relativity the gravitational collapse leads to a spacetime singularity. But this spacetime singularity can not be adequately described within general relativity, because the equivalence principle of general relativity is not valid for spacetime singularities; therefore, general relativity does not give a complete description of black holes. The same problem exists with regard to the postulated initial singularity of the expanding cosmos. In these cases, quantum mechanics and quantum eld theory also reach their limit; they are not applicable for highly curved spacetimes. For a certain curving parameter (the famous Planck scale), gravity has the same strength as the other interactions; then it is not possible to ignore gravity in the context of a quantum eld theoretical description. So, there exists no theory which would be able to describe gravitational collapses or which could explain, why (although they are predicted by general relativity) they don't happen, or why there is no spacetime singularity.
And the real problems start, if one brings general relativity and quantum eld theory together to describe black holes. Then it comes to rather strange forms of contradictions, and the mutual conceptual incompatibility of general relativity and quantum eld theory becomes very clear:
Black holes are according to general relativity surrounded by an event horizon. Material objects and radiation can enter the black hole, but nothing inside its event horizon can leave this region, because the gravitational pull is strong enough to hold back even radiation; the 4 ) which promises to close this gap. String theory, incomplete as it might be, is presently the most advanced attempt at an inclusion of gravity into the unication program of electrical interaction, are possibly able (in contrast to real photons, representing radiation) to leave the black hole. But why? There is no good reason and no good answer for that within our present theoretical framework. The same problem exists for the gravitational interaction, for the gravitational pull of the black hole exerted on massive objects outside its event horizon, if the gravitational force is understood as an exchange of gravitons between massive objects, as the quantum eld theoretical picture in its extrapolation to gravity suggests. How could (virtual) gravitons leave a black hole at all?
There are three possible scenarios resulting from the incompatibility of our assumptions about the characteristics of a black hole, based on general relativity, and on the picture quantum eld theory draws with regard to interactions:
1. Black holes don't exist in nature. They are a theoretical artifact, demonstrating the asymptotic inadequacy of Einstein's general theory of relativity. Only a quantum theory of gravity will explain where the general relativistic predictions fail, and why.
2. Black holes exist, as predicted by general relativity, and they have a mass and, in some cases, an electric charge, both leading to physical eects outside the event horizon. Then, we would have to explain, how these eects are realized physically. The quantum eld theoretical picture of interactions is either fundamentally wrong, or we would have to explain, why virtual photons behave completely dierent, with regard to black holes, from real radiation photons. Or the features of a black hole -mass, electric charge and angular momentum -would be features imprinted during its formation onto the spacetime surrounding the black hole or onto its event horizon. Then, interactions between a black hole and its environment would rather be interactions between the environment and the event horizon or even interactions within the environmental spacetime. Our present theories do not support this picture.
3. Black holes exist as the product of gravitational collapses, but they do not exert any eects on their environment. This is the craziest of all scenarios. For this scenario, general relativity would have to be fundamentally wrong. In contrast to the picture given by general relativity, black holes would have no physically eective features at all: no mass, no electric charge, no angular momentum, nothing. And after the formation of a black hole, there would be no spacetime curvature, because there remains no mass.
(Or, the spacetime curvature has to result from other eects.) The mass and the electric charge of objects falling (casually) into a black hole would be irretrievably lost. They would simply disappear from the universe, when they pass the event horizon. Black holes would not exert any forces on massive or electrically charged objects in their environment.
They would not pull any massive objects into their event horizon and increase thereby their mass. Moreover, their event horizon would mark a region causally disconnected with our universe: a region outside of our universe. Everything falling casually into the black hole, or thrown intentionally into this region, would disappear from the universe.
A decision between these scenarios will only be achievable within the context of a new theory which overcomes the incompatibility between general relativity and quantum eld theory. The same is valid for some further eminent problems and questions with regard to black holes: the Bekenstein-Hawking entropy of black holes and the microstates from which it might result, the spectrum of Hawking radiation, the information loss problem and the corresponding question 5 Conceptually, an all-encompassing unication seems to be feasible with it. And, if string theory should be successful, it would be the ideal rationale for the aforementioned idea that, possibly, a minimal conceptual and model-theoretical unication will only be achievable at the prize of an all-encompassing nomological unication.
But, in some ways, with string theory we have a new situation for physics: a situation in which many of the common argumentational and methodological procedures of the empirical sciences seem to become, at least partially, inadequate. There are some hints that the unication program of physics with string theory as its possibly nal stage transcends the context of physics and of the empirical sciences.
2 Superstrings
Superstring theories are supersymmetric string theories.
7 Supersymmetry is a symmetry relation between bosons (interaction quanta) and fermions (matter particles). It encompasses the Poincaré invariance of spacetime as well as the gauge symmetries of quantum eld theory. With supersymmetry, string theory postulates hitherto unobserved supersymmetric partners to the particles (and quanta) of the standard model of particle physics. However, in string theory, the basic constituents of matter are not any longer matter particles and interaction quanta, but one-dimensional oscillating entities: strings. Matter particles and interaction quanta are taken to be the basic, approximately massless oscillation modes of the string.
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The main competitor to string theory for the status of an emerging theory of quantum gravity is Loop Quantum Gravity. As an ospring of the canonical quantization program, loop quantum gravity is a non-perturbative quantum theory of gravitation, or of geometry respectively. No unication of the forces is intended with loop quantum gravity. Cf. Rovelli (2004) .
With regard to the incompleteness of both approaches to quantum gravity, Craig Callender and Nick Huggett note in the introduction to their anthology Physics meets Philosophy at the Planck Scale:
We should emphasize at the outset that currently there is no quantum theory of gravity in the sense that there is, say, a quantum theory of gauge elds. 'Quantum gravity' is merely a placeholder for whatever theory or theories eventually manage to bring together our theory of the very small, quantum mechanics, with our theory of the very large, general relativity. [...] However, there do exist many more-or-less developed approaches to the task -especially superstring theory and canonical quantum gravity. (Callender/Huggett 2001, p. 3). 6 Cf. Hedrich (2002a ) und Hedrich (2002c 7 A systematical introduction to string theory can be found in Polchinski (2000) ; Kaku (1999) ; Lüst/Theisen (1989) and Green/Schwarz/Witten (1987) . For recent developments, see especially Lerche (2000) ; Schwarz (2000) ; Dienes (1997) and Vafa (1997) . The early development of string theory is reected in a commented collection of original articles: Schwarz (1985) . Greene (1999) gives a recommendable popular introduction. Physics and Philosophy 2006 Id: 005 One of these basic oscillation modes of the string corresponds to a spin-2 particle which can be identied with the graviton, the interaction quantum of gravity.
Only its discovery made string theory a candidate for a unied theory of all interactions, including gravity.
8
Forced by intratheoretical consistency requirements (Lorentz invariance, unitarity etc.), the hitherto developed formulations of superstring theory embed the dynamics of the string into a ten-dimensional spacetime.
9 But, our common spacetime has only four dimensions. One of the solutions to this problem consists in the idea that the six surplus dimensions are comfactied microscopically in form of so-called Calabi-Yau Spaces.
10 An alternative idea consists in treating all dimensions as macroscopically extended and assuming that open strings, whose oscillation modes represent in this picture matter particles (and ourselves), are connected to Dirichlet-branes.
11 Our observable universe would be a three-dimensional D-brane developing in time within a ten-dimensional spacetime. Only gravitons, as oscillation modes of closed strings, would move freely within this ten-dimensional spacetime. But, at the moment, this is merely a speculation.
However, the serious problems of string theory are of a dierent kind. On the one hand, although string theory exists since more than thirty years, it does not provide the least numerical results which could be used for an empirical test of the theoretical framework.
8 It can also be expected that with the transition from point particles to strings the nonrenormalizability of the earlier quantum eld theoretical treatments of gravity should be avoidable.
9 There are ve dierent perturbation-theoretical formulations of ten-dimensional supersymmetric string theory. M-Theory, a non-perturbative eleven-dimensional extrapolation from these ve string theories, is not much more than a research program. Cf. Du (1996); Schwarz (1996) ; Schwarz (1997) ; Sen (1998) and Banks et al. (1997) . Edward Witten, one of the most prominent protagonists of string theory, wrote in 1997 with regard to M-Theory (Witten 1997, p. 32 
The novelty of the last couple of years, in a nutshell, is that we have learned that the strong-coupling behavior of supersymmetric string theories and eld theories is governed by a web of dualities relating dierent theories. When one description breaks down because a coupling parameter becomes large, another description takes over. [...] we learn that the dierent theories are all one. The dierent supertheories studied in dierent ways in the last generation are dierent manifestations of one underlying, and still mysterious, theory, sometimes called M-theory, where M stands for magic, mystery or membrane, according to taste. This theory is the candidate for superunication of the forces of nature.
The approximate equations that string theorists currently use are not powerful enough to work out the resulting physics fully for any choice of Calabi-Yau shape. [...] precise and denitive physical conclusions, such as the mass of the electron or the strength of the weak force, require equations that are far more exact than the present approximate framework. [...] the 'natural' energy scale of string theory is the Planck energy, and it is only through extremely delicate cancellations that string theory yields vibrational patterns with masses in the vicinity of those of the known matter and force particles. (Greene 1999, p. 220) .
On the other hand, not the least idea does exist with regard to a fundamental principle which could serve as basis, as physical motivation and as model-theoretical starting point for the development of the theory. In contrast, general relativity and its spacetime structure, into which gravity is implemented, can be understood as consequences of the principle of equivalence; the dynamics described by quantum eld theories is based on local gauge invariance. No such principle is known for string theory:
Ironically, although superstring theory is supposed to provide a unied eld theory of the Universe, the theory itself often seems like a confused jumble of folklore, random rules of thumb, and intuitions. This is because the development of superstring theory has been unlike that of any other theory [...] . Superstring theory [...] has been evolving backward for the past 30 years. It has a bizarre history [...] . [...] physicists have ever since been trying to work backward to fathom the physical principles and symmetries that underlie the theory. [...] the fundamental physical and geometrical principles that lie at the foundation of superstring theory are still unknown. (Kaku 1999, pp. vii) .
The story of string theory is not easy to tell, because even now we do not really know what string theory is. We know a great deal about it, enough to know that it is something really marvelous. We know much about how to carry out certain kinds of calculations in string theory.
Those calculations suggest that, at the very least, string theory may be part of the ultimate quantum theory of gravity. But we do not have a good denition of it, nor do we know what its fundamental principles are. (It used to be said that string theory was part of twenty-rst century mathematics that had fallen by luck into our hands in the twentieth century. This does not sound quite as good now as it used to.) The problem is that we do not yet have string theory expressed in any form that could be that of a fundamental theory. What we have on paper cannot be considered to be the theory itself. What we have is no more than a long list of examples of solutions of the theory; what we do not yet have is the theory they are solutions of. It is as if we had a long list of solutions to the Einstein equations, without Physics and Philosophy 2006 Id: 005 knowing the basic principles of general relativity or having any way to write down the actual equation that denes the theory. / Or, to take a simpler example, string theory in its present form most likely has the same relationship to its ultimate form as Kepler's astronomy had to Newton's physics. (Smolin 2000, pp. 149) .
Uniqueness
Although a fundamental, physically interpretable principle which should form the basis of string theory is still unknown, and although it is not even clear, if such a principle exists at all, string theorists have emphasized all the time the internal mathematical coherence of their theoretical construct, making plausible this coherence with the fact that most of the apparent mathematical alternatives for the formulation of the theory proved to be inconclusive because of the occurrence of mathematical, physical and conceptual anomalies. This postulated coherence has been used as an argument for the uniqueness of the theoretical approach.
[...] the unication of the forces is accomplished in a way determined almost uniquely by the logical requirement that the theory be internally consistent. (Green 1986, p. 44) .
But the crucial step in this argumentation consists in taking logical and conceptual coherence (an indispensable requirement for every theory) as sucient to establish the adequacy of a postulated theoretical description of nature.
I believe that we have found the unique mathematical structure that consistently combines quantum mechanics and general relativity. So it must almost certainly be correct. (Schwarz 1998, p. 2) .
In this argumentation, empirical testability seems to be irrelevant. This is understandable, at least strategically, for a theoretical approach which, after more than thirty years of development, does not provide of any empirically testable results.
12
12 Although the coherence-to-uniqueness-to-adequacy argument is used in string theory for the rst time as a direct substitute for empirical control, it existed even before string theory. It was, though never used as a substitute for empirical control, at least partially apparent already in general relativity and in quantum eld theory.
Although this contingency of physical laws has been the point of view adopted by most modern scientists, there have been some attempts even in the present century to show that physical laws are unique and necessary or that certain apparently contingent general features of the world are in fact necessary. (Cushing 1985, p. 33 ).
Cushing saw in this tendency the rst indications of a possible metamorphosis with regard to our understanding of scientic methodology and the criteria of scientic justication.
The general scheme remains hypothetico-deductive, but the coherence constraint becomes much tighter. (Cushing 1985, p. 32) .
In string theory, the coherence-to-uniqueness-to-adequacy argument now has reached nally its climax. In his long search for a unied theory, Einstein reected on whether 'God could have made the Universe in a dierent way; that is, whether the necessity of logical simplicity leaves any freedom at all.' With this remark, Einstein articulated the nascent form of a view that is currently shared by many physicists: If there is a nal theory of nature, one of the most convincing arguments in support of its particular form would be that the theory couldn't be otherwise. The ultimate theory should take the form that it does because it is the unique explanatory framework capable of describing the universe without running up against any internal inconsistencies or logical absurdities. Such a theory would declare that things are the way they are because they have to be that way. Any and all variations, no matter how small, lead to a theory that -like the phrase 'This sentence is a lie' -sows the seeds of its own destruction. / Establishing such inevitability in the structure of the universe would take us a long way toward coming to grips with some of the deepest questions of the ages. These questions emphasize the mystery surrounding who or what made the unnumerable choices apparently required to design our universe. Inevitability answers these questions by erasing the options. Inevitability means that, in actuality, there are no choices. Inevitability declares that the universe could not have been dierent. [...] the pursuit of such rigidity in the laws of nature lies at the heart of the unication program in modern physics. (Greene 1999, pp. 283 ).
So, the metaphysical intuition behind the uniqueness argument consists primarily in the idea that things are as they are, because they have to be the way they are.
There are logical constraints that make nature the way it is. There is no freedom of choice. There is only one possibility. There is no contingency. Nature is the result of an all-encompassing necessity. It could not be otherwise. The world is unique.
But then, so the intuition, there can be only one unique, adequate, consistent, all-encompassing description of nature. The constraints leading to the uniqueness of our world would be reected by its theoretical description. And they would nally guarantee the adequacy of this consistent, all-encompassing description.
But, if there can be only one coherent, all-encompassing, adequate description of the world, one would need only very few requirements for our fundamental physical theory: (i) logical and conceptual consistency and (ii) most advanced universality. The rst completely unied, consistently formulated, universal theory we nd, would be this adequate description of nature. And the provable mathematical uniqueness of this theory would only reinforce the argument.
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In the broadest sense, bootstrap philosophy asserts that nature is as it is because this is the only possible nature consistent with itself. (Chew 1968, p. 762). 14 The uniqueness idea also reinforces the hope that a fundamental nomological description of nature will not need any free parameters.
For many decades there has been a consensus on how to solve the problems of the undetermined parameters: unify the dierent forces and particles by increasing the symmetry of the theory and the number of parameters will decrease. The expectation that unication reduces the number of parameters in a theory is due So it had better be unique, otherwise there would be unanswerable questions, having to do with choosing which unied theory corresponds to nature. (Smolin 2004, p. 8) .
If a fundamental theory includes free, empirically adjustable parameters, the suspicion remains that it is not really fundamental, that there should be an even more fundamental theory explaining these free parameters. The only alternative is that these free parameters reect a fundamental contingency. Our fundamental theory would describe a spectrum of possibilities, of possible worlds, and a specic description of our world would need the specication of these free parameters. Exactly this alternative is excluded by the metaphysical thesis of the uniqueness of our world. So, at least a really fundamental description of a unique world would be programmatically incompatible with free, adjustable parameters. Free parameters reect either contingency or that our theory is not the fundamental theory. So, the idea of a unique fundamental description of nature excludes free parameters.
Also, in the same way, the distinction between theory and contingent boundary conditions is not acceptable for a unique fundamental theory. All theoretically relevant elements, not explained by a theory, show that either there is contingency, incompatible with the uniqueness intuition, or that the theory is not fundamental. What about the nomology described by a fundamental theory and its spectrum of solutions?
Finally, also this distinction is incompatible with the concept of a unique fundamental theory.
The necessity of a selection between solutions, if this selection is not determined by the theory itself, leads to the same problems; there remains only the alternative between fundamental contingency and non-fundamentality of the theory -analogous to the case of free parameters or of contingent boundary conditions. So, a complete exclusion of contingency is probably a very hard job for physics. Maybe it can only be achieved within metaphysics.
If this hope is realized, then it suces to nd that one unied theory.
The rst fully consistent unied theory to be found will be the only one that can be found and it will thus have to be the true theory of nature. It has even been said that, because of this, physics no longer needs experimental input to progress. At the advent of string theory, this kind of talk was very common. The transition from physics as an experimental science to physics based on nding the single unied theory was even called the passage from modern to postmodern physics. (Smolin 2005, pp. 26) .
The fundamental problem with the uniqueness idea is that it might be false. There could be contingency in the world. The world has not necessarily to be unique.
Other worlds could be possible. Then, our consistent, all-encompassing theory has not necessarily to be adequate for the description of our world. Consistency and universality would not necessarily mean adequacy. There could be more than one consistent, universal theory, some describing other possible worlds, and only one, possibly, describing our world.
However, even given the case that our world would be unique, the relation between nature and our description of it might be rather complicated. There would be no guarantee that the logical constraints decisive for the uniqueness of the world are adequately and completely reected within the results of our scientic endeavour.
Even in the case of the uniqueness of the world, there could remain an ambiguity for possible consistent and universal theories. This could be a consequence of the procedures we apply in the development of scientic models and theories. Given such an ambiguity with regard to consistent, universal theories, only empirical tests could reinforce the adequacy claim. Also, it might be possible that we will never be able to formulate a consistent theory of utmost universality that provides an adequate description of nature.
There is no guarantee to achieve this goal within the scientic procedures and the conceptual framework at our disposal. Our epistemic capacities might be insufcient to attain an adequate, all-encompassing understanding of nature. Maybe there remains always a residuum of unexplainability, inaccessible to our epistemic means.
But, as a result of recent developments in string theory, these warnings are no longer necessary. During the last years a demythologization of the uniqueness argument shook the string community. String theories seem to describe, instead of one unique world, a plethora of possible worlds. And, at the moment, it is not even clear, if our world is one of them.
Contingency
No one described the process of demythologization of the uniqueness idea in string theory better than Leonard Susskind:
The world view shared by most physicists is that the laws of nature are uniquely described by some special action principle that completely determines the vacuum, the spectrum of elementary particles, the forces and the symmetries. Experience with quantum electrodynamics and quantum chromodynamics suggests a world with a small number of parameters and a unique ground state. For the most part, string theorists bought into this paradigm. At rst it was hoped that string theory would be unique and explain the various parameters that quantum eld theory left unexplained. When this turned out to be false, the belief developed that there were exactly ve string theories with names like type-2a and Heterotic. This also turned out to be wrong. Instead, a continuum of theories were discovered that smoothly interpolated between the ve and also included a theory called M-Theory. The language changed a little. One no longer spoke of dierent theories, but rather dierent solutions of some master theory. (Susskind 2003, p. 1) .
Signicantly more ironic is Lee Smolin's comment:
[...] the number of string theories for which there is some evidence for has been growing exponentially as string theorists developed better techniques to construct them. (Smolin 2004, p. 10) .
One of the fundamental problems with this multitude of string scenarios is to set them in relation to observable phenomenology. So, it should, not at least, be possible to identify the quantum eld theoretical standard model of elementary particle physics, with its interactions and symmetries, as one of the low energy limits resulting from the spectrum of possible string scenarios.
16 But this seems 16 In this context, the free parameters of the standard model should be reproduced and explained by a theoretical scenario which works, on the fundamental level, without these parameters. It is not at all claried, if this will be possible:
All currently accepted physical theories require some phenomenological input.
Our recent enthusiasm for string theory as the theory of everything has given rise to the hope that the only necessary inputs are the basic dimensionful parameters to be rather problematic. There exists in string theory an immense number of possibilities for the broken symmetries in the energy range of the standard model.
In Michio Kaku's words, there are [...] millions of ways to break down the theory to low energies. (Kaku 1999, p. 17) .
The ambiguity with regard to the resulting low energy symmetries is, not at least, a consequence of the ambiguity caused by the immense number of possibilities for the transition from the original ten-dimensional dynamics of string theory, forced by the requirement of internal consistency, to the phenomenologically relevant implications for a four-dimensional spacetime. So, there is an immense number of possible combinations of these partially continuous and partially discrete geometrical and topological parameters which characterize the structure of the corresponding compact manifold and which can vary for every point on the four-dimensional spacetime resulting from the compactication. These parameters are usually called moduli.
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Most important for the relation between the spectrum of string scenarios and phenomenology is that dierent parameter combinations, corresponding to dierent compactication scenarios, lead in almost all cases to completely dierent physical results on the extended four-dimensional spacetime remaining after compactication. So, dierent compactication scenarios mean dierent physics: dierent symmetries, dierent particle spectra and masses, dierent eective low energy parameters.
[...] there are many Calabi-Yau three-folds and each gives rise to dierent physics in M 4 . Having no means to choose which one is 'right', we lose predictive power. (Greene 1997, p. 9) .
And this physical and, consequently, phenomenological variability seems to be independent from the question, if the six compactied surplus dimensions of string theory should be interpreted geometrically as real space-dimensions or rather as a useful picture for an internal dynamical parameterization. It seems to be independent of the question, if compactication should be understood in a realistic sense as spacetime phenomenon or rather as a structural metaphor for the parameterizable multitude of expression modes of the low energy phenomenology of a still unknown fundamental theory of which string theory is an approximation.
Let's have a closer look at the problems resulting from the spectrum of string sce- Appearing as massless scalar elds within the four-dimensional spacetime, the moduli lead to long-range interactions, being in competition with gravity and thereby violating the equivalence principle. The hope remains that they are an artifact of the perturbative approach of string theory.
These massless elds are all called moduli elds, and they are a desaster. space and corresponds to a resulting eective low energy nomology for the extended four-dimensional spacetime: a string vacuum.
18 To compare these string vacua with the observable phenomenology, it would be necessary to derive the low energy implications (e.g. the parameters for the eective low energy quantum eld theories) for all possible moduli combinations. But, this can not be achieved within the framework of perturbative string theory.
19 However, even if the calculation of the low energy implications of a specic compactication scheme (or even of all compactication schemes) were possible, the problem would remain that there are a lot of dierent string vacua amongst which we had to look for the symmetries and the coupling parameters of the standard model, or for the phenomenologically adequate scenario respectively. And we would probably have
to explain afterwards what distinguishes the identied vacuum from all the others. We would have to explain, why exactly the identied vacuum is realized in our world.
And it is a massive understatement to talk about a lot of string scenarios: recent estimations suggest between 10 100 and 10 500 eective four-dimensional string vacua.
20 For this spectrum recently the terms landscape 21 and discretuum 22
were introduced.
23
The string landscape can be best understood as a multidimensional conguration space of the parameterization of possible eective physical scenarios (worlds), with dierent symmetries, with dierent interactions and interaction structures, with dierent coupling parameters, with dierent particle spectra and particle masses.
For practical purposes, the landscape gives us a large set of alternative eective Lagrangians for describing the physics we have observed in our universe. These are parametrized by a collection of numbers, which include the dimensions of space-time, the name, rank and representation content of the low energy gauge theory, the value of the 18 For a rst comparison with phenomenology, it is probably sucient to restrict considerations to the string vacua, because they reect the most relevant low energy implications.
[...] most of the physics that is observable at low energies seems to be governed by the vacuum (zero mode) structure and not by the microscopic theory, at least as far as we can see today. (Lerche 2000, p. 19) .
19 And there does not exist any consistent non-perturbative formulation of string theory, a problem connected probably to the fact, that the fundamental physical principle of string theory is still unknown.
20 Until now, the investigation of string vacua and their statistics has been carried out exclusively by means of approximations for weak coupling, and by subsequent combinatorial reasoning. The correctness of the results depends on the hope that the duality relations between the perturbative formulations of string theory lead to a suciently representative picture of the spectrum of string vacua. Cf. Douglas (2003) .
21 Cf. Susskind (2003 Banks points out to the fact that there exists no common action function in the sense of quantum eld theory for the dierent string scenarios of the landscape.
So, the idea of dierent solutions to the same theory and, especially, of the possibility of transitions between these solutions by variation of certain parameters is, according to Banks, not applicable to string theory.
Banks has argued cogently that one cannot use eective eld theory to study multiple vacua in theories of gravity. For example, in many circumstances there are no transitions between the dierent states, and an observer in one can not do experiments which will indicate the existence of others. So it is not clear that the multiplicity of states has any meaning. (Dine 2004a, p. 7) .
It is an illusion, as Banks suggests, that the dierent string vacua of the landscape are resulting from the same theory. Dierent moduli-combinations belong, according to Banks, to completely dierent Hamilton functions.
The notion of dierent vacua of the same theory, in any of the senses that this is meant in quantum eld theory, is simply not applica- So, either we can get to the conclusion that the landscape of string theory does not exist.
Still, the possibility that the landscape may not exist should be kept in mind. (Dine 2004a, p. 73) .
Or, to interpret Banks' arguments in another way, the landscape does not consist of dierent solutions of the same theory, but of an immense multitude of per se autonomous theoretical scenarios and nomological structures which belong, in a certain way, to the same family of theories. Then, transitions between these scenarios do not exist. One can not get dynamically, by variation of parameters, from one scenario to another.
The problem of the relation between the landscape of string theory and the observable low energy phenomenology remains. And even if the landscape hypothesis will be elaborated in a more conclusive way within string theory, it is evidently impossible that a vacuum which resembles our world will be found within the vacua resulting from the supermoduli-space. This means that all vacua resulting from the supermoduli-space would be energetically degenerated. There wouldn't be any energy dierences between the string vacua resulting from the supermoduli-space which might help to identify and select a vacuum which could be assumed as being realized physically in our world.
And, supersymmetry has a further decisive consequence: For all string vacua resulting from the supermoduli-space the cosmological constant is necessarily zero. On the supermoduli-space the cosmological constant is also exactly zero. Roughly speaking, the supermoduli-space is a perfectly at plain at exactly zero altitude. (Susskind 2003, p. 2) .
This seems to be incompatible with recent astrophysical data and with their corresponding cosmological implications.
A key problem has been constructing string theories that agree with the astronomical evidence that the vacuum energy (or cosmological constant) is positive.
The problem is that a positive cosmological constant is not consistent with supersymmetry. But supersymmetry appears to be necessary to cancel dramatic instabilities having to do with the existence of tachyons in the spectrum of string theories. (Smolin (2004) we would already have found these supersymmetric partners. So, only a broken supersymmetry can be realized in our world. Because all string vacua resulting from the supermoduli-space are fully supersymmetric, obviously none of these vacua can give a description of our world.
So far, no string theory background is known which is consistent with all features of the observed universe. They all have one or more of the following features, which each disagree with observation: no positive cosmological constant, unbroken supersymmetry, massless scalar elds. (Smolin 2003, p. 48) .
If the spectrum of string vacua were exclusively resulting from the supermodulispace, string theory must be wrong. Supersymmetric vacua can not reproduce observable phenomenology. So, either string theory is wrong, or the supermodulispace can not be everything which contributes to the spectrum of string vacua. How could a broken supersymmetry result from string theory without leading to mathematical and physical anomalies? Ten-dimensional perturbative string theories are necessarily fully supersymmetric. The only possibility imagined until now consists in the idea that supersymmetry breaking is a result of compactication.
The mathematics of compactication should therefore make understandable how a broken supersymmetry and the fact that we don't observe supersymmetry multiplets in our world can result from a fully supersymmetric theory. There should be compactications which lead from a fully supersymmetric ten-dimensional theory to a broken supersymmetry for the resulting four-dimensional vacuum.
Then, the string landscape would contain vacua which do not result from the supermoduli-space. But this extension of the spectrum of string vacua is actually no more than a speculative extrapolation. Nonetheless, some string theorists hope to be able to establish a denition for a non-zero potential for these vacua with broken supersymmetry.
[...] the supermoduli-space is a perfectly at plain at exactly zero altitude. Once we move o the plain, supersymmetry is broken and a non-zero potential develops [...] Thus beyond the at plain we encounter hills and valleys. We are particularly interested in the valleys where we nd local minima of V. (Susskind 2003, pp. 2) .
But, as long as there are no reliable mathematical foundations for this picture, it is pure speculation.
No perfectly precise denition exists in string theory for the moduli elds or their potential when we go away from the supermoduli-space. (Susskind 2003, p. 17) .
According to Banks, the idea of dening an eective potential for the landscape is not wellfounded, if not meaningless at all:
Much of the thinking implicit in discussions of ux compactications depends on the notion that the eective potential is an exact object, for which we are presently able to nd only approximate expressions. This line of thought might be completely wrong. We have no evidence from string theory or gravity that such an object exists. (Banks/Dine/Gorbatov 2003, p. 8) .
In my opinion, the concept of an eective potential on moduli space as a tool for nding string models of gravity, is a snare and a delusion, fostered by wishful thinking, and without regard to the actual evidence in front of us. There is no evidence for this concept in solid string theory calculations, and lots of evidence against it. (Banks 2004, p. 4 For a long time string theorists held to the idea that there can be only one consistent, fundamental theory which describes our world, and that this theory is string theory. Meanwhile, it turned out that the string approach very probably leads to an immense multitude of theoretical scenarios describing possible worlds with dierent eective low energy nomology.
For low energy observers, physics is dierent in each of these states.
Gauge groups, coupling constants and the like all vary. The cosmological constant, in particular, is a random variable in these 10 1000 (?!) states. (Dine 2004b, p. 6 ).
If at all, only one of these theoretical scenarios will describe our world with its specic low energy phenomenology, its interactions, its gauge invariances, its coupling parameters, its particle spectrum, its particle masses, and its spacetime structure and dimensionality.
We believe that there are many mathematically consistent models of quantum gravity, at most one of which describes the real world.
(Banks/Dine/Gorbatov 2003, p. 5).
But, which of the theoretical scenarios the string approach leads to, which of its string vacua, corresponds to our world?
Despite the unity of the theory, string/M theory appears to describe a very large number of four dimensional (and other) vacua with inequivalent physics, most of which clearly do not describe our universe.
At present we have no clue which one is relevant, or how to nd it.
(Douglas 2003, p. 1).
If there exist 10 100 or 10 500 dierent string vacua, how can we identify the adequate scenario? At the time, it is completely implausible that the low energy implications for these dierent string scenarios could be calculated.
It is clear that at a certain point in this process, if we don't falsify the landscape easily, we will run into the problem that current technology does not allow one to calculate the low energy parameters with any degree of precision. Indeed, the error estimates are only guesses because we don't even know in principle how to calculate the next term in the expansion in large uxes. (Banks 2004, p. 19 ).
But, even if it would be possible to derive the low energy phenomenology for these scenarios, the immense number of string vacua would lead to a problem.
Clarity would only be achieved, if it could be shown that the string approach, on principle, does not lead to any scenario compatible with observable low energy phenomenology. Then string theory would simply not be able to describe our world. This would falsify string theory. If a falsication via incompatibility with low energy phenomenology will not take place, the problem remains. If there are 10 100 or 10 500 string vacua, and if there are no constraints which exclude vacua resembling our world on principle, then, even after a preselection which leaves only those vacua which resemble more or less our world, there will probably still remain an immense multitude of possible vacua, compatible with the observable phenomenology, but with dierent nomology. And, if this preselected ensemble of vacua corresponds to a continuum or a dense discretuum of parameter values, it will be impossible to identify by empirical means the vacuum representing our world, and therefore the nomology it is based on, because the xing of the relevant parameters by measurement will only lead to a nite exactitude.
However, if one takes the possibility of the existence of these theories seriously, there is a disturbing consequence. For the number of distinct theories that the evidence points to is vast, estimates have been made on the order of 10 100 to 10 500 . Each of these theories is consistent with the macroscopic world being four dimensional, and the existence of a positive and small vacuum energy. But they disagree about everything else, in particular, they imply dierent versions of elementary particle physics, with dierent gauge groups, spectra of fermions and scalars and dierent parameters. / That is, if the string theorists are right, there are on the order of 10 100 or more dierent ways to consistently unify gauge elds, fermions and gravity. This makes it likely that string theory will never make any new, testable predictions concerning the elementary particles. / Of course, a very small proportion of these theories will be consistent with the data we have, to date, about particle physics. Suppose this is only one in 10 50 . There will still be 10 50 dierent theories, which will dier on what we will see in future experiments at higher energy. This number is so vast, it appears likely that whatever is found, there will be many versions of string theory that agree with it. (Smolin 2004, p. 11 ).
We would never get from the observable phenomenology to the nomology from which it results. There would simply be too much possible nomologies behind the observable phenomenology and compatible with it. Not the least idea seems to exist, why a specic scenario out of the spectrum of possibilities is realized with our world.
The recent progress in non-perturbative string theory does not solve the problem of the choice of vacuum state either. The progress is rather conceptual [...] . (Lerche 2000, p. 20) .
The fundamental question behind the vacuum selection problem of string theory is, if it will ever be possible to deduce all features of the world from a fundamental description of nature, or if this strategy, aicted with contingency as the world might be, won't be successful. Does the road to a unied and all-encompassing description of nature lead to an elimination of contingency or will our universe turn out to be only one contingently selected possibility out of a vast spectrum of consistently possible scenarios?
Nomological extrapolation is carried as far as possible in string theory. But, meanwhile, with the landscape hypothesis and in absence of any reasonable selection principle, is seems very improbable that a complete elimination of contingency can be achieved in the context of string theory. String theory does not support the idea that our world and its specic features are necessary. Moreover, the uniqueness hypothesis to which string theorists held for a long time, and, with it, the background assumption of a contingency-free, in its features completely necessary world, the only consistent world at all, got a highly problematic status with the recent developments in string theory, not to say that it was completely brought down with the landscape hypothesis. If string theory gives an adequate description of nature (a probably unprovable assumption, if the following is correct), and if the landscape hypothesis should turn out to be string theory's inevitable consequence, that would mean that there is obviously not only one consistent structure describing the one and only consistent world, but a lot of such structures, and therefore a lot of possible worlds. Our world would simply be contingent with regard to its specic features and its structure. Many structures, or many worlds respectively, with dierent physics, would be possible. Ours would be only one of these possible worlds.
In this case, it might be that a unied, fundamental theory would not especially refer to our world, but rather to the whole spectrum of possibilities. Our universe (to use the language of the dominant model-theoretical apparatus of physics, i.e.
systems of dierential equations) would perhaps be represented by one of the many solutions of the fundamental equations of a nal, unied theory. The fundamental equations of the theory would represent the whole ensemble of possible worlds. Under these conditions, a unied theory would not determine the features and the nomological structure of our world without the specication of some free parameters. These parameters would be a constitutive part of the solution 29 But, naturally, to talk about an ensemble of causally unconnected, real worlds means to take for granted (at least for the argument's sake) a very stable realism including the willingness to attribute real ontic status to entities which are empirically inaccessible by denition. So, there is no doubt that the ensemble hypothesis is a metaphysical concept, unprovable empirically on principle. And therefore, there will only be a reasonable motivation for the ensemble hypothesis, if there exists (beside the highly speculative theoretical ideas of string theory) a context of relevance based, at least partially, in empirical evidence (and, furthermore, completely independent of string theory and its landscape hypothesis).
But, before turning to such a context (the spectrum of possible explanations for the ne-tuning of the universe) it is useful to have a closer look at the ensemble hypothesis and its implications.
Crucial for the transition from the contingency hypothesis to the ensemble hy- A There exists (in the same sense that our chairs, tables and our universe exists) a very large ensemble of 'universes', M which are completely or almost completely causally disjoint regions of spacetime, within which the parameters of the standard models of physics and cosmology dier. To the extent that they are causally disjoint, we have no ability to make observations in other universe than our own.
The parameters of the standard models of particle physics and cosmology vary over the ensemble of universes. (Smolin 2004, p. 4) C There are many dierent possible consistent phenomenological descriptions of physics, relevant for the possible description of elementary particle physics at scales less than Planck energies. These may correspond to dierent phases of the vacuum, or dierent theories altogether. (Smolin 2004, p. 12) Multiverse hypothesis. Assuming A and C, the whole of reality -which we call the multiverse -consists of many dierent regions of spacetime, within which phenomena are governed by dierent of these phenomenological descriptions. For simplicity, we call these universes. (Smolin 2004, p. 12 (Tegmark 1998, p. 4) .
But, as Tegmark suggests, the spectrum of consistent possibilities is probably not as immense as one might think:
Although a rich variety of structures enjoys mathematical existence, the variety is limited by the requirement of self-consistency and by the identication of isomorphic ones. (Tegmark 1998, p. 8) .
Crucial for 30 Cf. Tegmark (1998). Tegmark's theory can be seen as the ideal contrasting background to the vacuum selection problem of string theory, at least as long as string theory is supposed not to cover all mathematically consistent possibilities, but only a specic part of these, preselected by specic nomological constraints. It would be most interesting, if it could be shown that string theory already includes all mathematically consistent possibilities, as Wolfgang Lerche suggests:
In view of the many non-trivial consistency constraints that are fullled, it is most likely that there is simply no room for a 'dierent' consistent theory; in other words, it is likely that what we have found is the complete space of all possible consistent quantum theories that include gravity, and string theory may perhaps be viewed as one way of eciently parametrizing it (in certain regions of its parameter space). (Lerche 2000, p. 33 ).
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But, not even every consistent structure will contain self-aware substructures which could perceive the structure they inhabit as existing. And, if a mathematical structure does not contain self-aware substructures, it is, according to Tegmark, completely pointless to ask for the physical existence of the structure. 
31
The picture is that some of these mathematical structures contain 'self-aware substructures' [...] . To calculate the physical predictions of the theory, we therefore need to address the following questions:
1. Which structures contain [self-aware substructures]?
2. How do these [self-aware substructures] perceive the structures that they are part of ?
3. Given what we perceive, which mathematical structures are most likely to be the ones that we inhabit? (Tegmark 1998, p. 39 ).
In the top-down approach, the objective is to nd out which structures exist physically, i.e. which of the consistent structures contain self-aware substructures.
[...] we are asking how large the 'cognizable' part of the grand ensemble is. (Tegmark 1998, p. 39) .
31 In string theory, the global perspective corresponds to the investigation of the spectrum of vacua within the landscape, and of the statistics of this spectrum; the particular perspective corresponds to the problem to identify, starting from the observable phenomenology, the string vacuum realized in our world.
For that, one has to investigate the entire parameter space of structural possibilities with regard to the question, which constellations lead to the necessary and adequate preconditions for self-aware substructures. (Tegmark 1998, p. 48 ).
The bottom-up strategy corresponds to our usual scientic procedures. Our situation in the world can be characterized, above all, by the fact that it is not at all obvious which structure we inhabit.
33 So, how can this structure be identied from the particular perspective of a self-aware substructure, the observer, the experimentator? This problem is the starting point of all empirical research and, therefore, of the development of scientic theories. It is exactly what makes empirical science necessary. It is the struggle to get from the phenomenology to the nomology, i.e. to the mathematical structure behind appearance. In the case of the structure we inhabit, this investigation is going on at least since Galileo
Galilei.
34
32 Although this is certainly no simple task, Tegmark has already some ideas about the possible results of such an investigation.
However, since the number of constraints for our own particular existence is much greater than the number of free parameters, we argued that it is likely that there is an archipelago of many such small islands, corresponding to dierent nuclear and it is likely that the total number of islands is nite. (Tegmark 1998, p. 40 ).
[...] islands of habitability are small and rare [...] it might even be possible to catalogue all of them. (Tegmark 1998, p. 40). 33 The connecting link between the top-down and the bottom-up approaches consists in the question, how a structure, existing in the Tegmarkian sense, would appear to the self-aware substructures it contains. How would a structure appear from an inner perspective? What phenomenology would a specic structure evoke?
34 But, according to Tegmark's opinion, there could be limits for our scientic approach.
There could be unavoidable ambiguities with regard to the possible structures behind appearance. Dierent structures might be compatible with our phenomenology. The only viable strategy would then consist in taking the simplest of these structures as the eective nomology leading to observable phenomenology.
Since some aspects of complex mathematical structures can often be approximated by simpler ones, we might never be able to determine precisely which one we are part of. However, if this should turn out to be the case, it clearly will not matter, since we can then obtain all possible physical predictions by just assuming that our structure is the simplest of the candidates. (Tegmark 1998, p. 42 ).
However, the most serious problem is not ambiguity. It is not the case in which we nd too many nomological structures compatible with the observable phenomenology; it is rather the case in which we don't nd even one empirically adequate nomological structure. 
36
The fact of the matter is that we to date have found no self-consistent mathematical structure that can demonstrably describe both quantum and general relativistic phenomena. (Tegmark 1998, p. 48). 35 Cf. Tegmark (1996) .
36 Cf. Barrow/Tipler (1986); Hartle (2004) and Smolin (2004) .
Anthropica
The weak anthropic principle itself is nothing but a tautology. It simply reminds us that the world we inhabit must necessarily fulll conditions that make our existence possible. We can not live in a world which is incompatible with our existence.
This rather tautological (but often overlooked) statement that we have no right to be surprised about things necessary for our existence has been termed the weak anthropic principle. (Tegmark 1998, p. 6 ).
The weak anthropic principle becomes only an interesting tautology in combination with the idea that some or perhaps even most of the possible worlds, more or less dierent from ours, would probably lead to conditions which make the existence of complex organisms with epistemic capacities impossible. We would never nd ourselves in such worlds, simply because we could not live in these worlds. Even if there would be a multitude of worlds, it is evident that we necessarily inhabit a world that has a make-up which allows our existence. This would not be an accidental coincidence, but one of the preconditions of our existence.
Not only the principal ontological and nomological possibilities would be decisive for the spectrum of worlds in which we might nd ourselves, but, to a far greater amount, the conditions which are indispensable for our existence. 38 Rees (1999) and Barrow/Tipler (1986) . A minimal variation of the cosmological constant realized in our universe, e.g., would make the formation of large-scale cosmological structures 
41
If there remains anything at all for scientic endeavors, it is the third alternative.
That our universe is made-to-measure for our existence would be no miracle, if there exists a suciently large ensemble of physically real 42 universes. We would nd ourselves necessarily in a universe compatible with our existence. The netuning of the universe would be an anthropic selection eect.
43 The ensemble hypothesis given, the ne-tuning of the universe is no surprise.
39 Cf. Sloterdijk/Macho (1991) .
40 Cf. Bostrom (2003) ; Hanson (2001); Schmidhuber (1997) and Tipler (1994) .
41 Cf. Galouye (1964 43 But, one should not think that an anthropical selection would lead to unambiguity with regard to the specic features of the universe in which we nd ourselves. It is rather unclear what characteristics exactly are subject to an anthropic selection and how much variation of the relevant parameters is compatible with the existence of intelligent life. Probably, the low energy gauge symmetries, the parameters of the low energy Lagrangian, the matter content (quantity and variety) of the universe, and especially the dimensionality of spacetime will be anthropically decisive and will only admit small variations. The same holds probably for the complexity of material systems which the fundamental nomology admits:
Fully linear equations (where all elds are uncoupled) presumably lack the complexity necessary for [self-aware substructures], whereas nonlinearity is notorious for introducing instability and unpredictability (chaos). In other words, it is not implausible that there exists only a small number of possible systems of [partial dierential equations] that balance between violating the complexity constraint on one hand and violating the predictability and stability constraints on the other hand. (Tegmark 1998, p. 38 However, it is very doubtful, admittedly, that the ensemble hypothesis with its strong realism with regard to, on principle and by denition, inaccessible universes can really be considered a scientic concept. And therefore, it is also very doubtful that the explanation of the ne-tuning of the universe by means of the ensemble hypothesis is a scientic explanation in the strict sense. But the alternatives would be either the assumption of pure cosmic coincidence or the designer-universe scenario. And with these alternatives the scientic endeavor to understand nature ends denitively. So, if anything at all, only the ensemble hypothesis remains.
And with the ensemble hypothesis as an argumentative scenario which, at least, makes the ne-tuning of the universe no miracle, theoretical models and physical theories supporting ensemble scenarios are back in the game. In this context, string theory reenters and possibly even gains additional plausibility.
44 With regard to (i) the ne-tuning of the universe, (ii) the immense multitude of consistent theoretical scenarios resulting from string theory, and (iii) the non-existence of a vacuum selection principle which could be motivated by the theoretical framework, it seems not completely implausible to understand the selection of a string vacuum, representing our world, as an anthropic selection eect.
With nothing preferring one vacuum over another, the anthropic principle comes to the fore whether or not we like the idea. (Susskind 2003, p. 17) .
However, this would mean that the string scenarios of the landscape are not only nomological possibilities, but that they are physically realized. Only if they are physically realized, an anthropic selection can take place. Contingency alone is not sucient for anthropic selection. Anthropic selection works only within an ensemble of real worlds. So, a realism with regard to empirically inaccessible worlds seems to be unavoidable. It would only be avoidable, if there were some form of a causal or dynamical connection between the dierent members of the ensemble.
Recently, Leonard Susskind tried to formulate a concretization of this idea of a dynamical connection by implementing the process of anthropic selection into a cosmological scenario in which the dierent string vacua are realized by a sequence of dynamical transitions.
To make use of the enormous diversity of environments that string theory is likely to bring with it, we need a dynamical cosmology which, with high probability, will populate one or more regions of space with an anthropically favorable vacuum. (Susskind 2003, p. 11 ).
The idea is that one only needs a suciently large number of string vacua with dierent eective nomology, realized subsequently during cosmic evolution. But, should string theory describe nature, and should the ten dimensions of string theory turn out to be a realistic description of spacetime, should furthermore the landscape hypothesis be correct, and should dynamical transitions exist between the scenarios of the landscape, this could lead to rather stormy prospects for our universe.
If an observer starts with a large value of the cosmological constant there will be many ways for the causal patch to descend to the supermoduli-space. (Susskind 2003, p. 12) The potential on the supermoduli-space is zero and so it is always possible to lower the energy by tunneling to a point on the supermodulispace. (Susskind 2003, p. 9) The instability also allows the universe to sample all or a large part of the landscape by means of bubble formation. (Susskind 2003, p. 17) [...] it always ends in an innite expanding supersymmetric open Fr[i]edman universe. (Susskind 2003, p. 15) The nal and initial states do not have to be four dimensional. (Susskind 2003, p. 20) .
In short [...] if 1) there are extra dimensions of space and 2) the Universe is undergoing accelerated expansion, then the present fourdimensional state of the Universe is not a stable state. The Universe is catastrophically unstable either to decompactication of extra dimensions, to gravitational collapse to a big crunch, or in special cases, possibly to decay to a four-dimensional supersymmetric universe. (Giddings 2003, p. 3).
However, for all those who cling to life and need more certainty, there are Banks' already mentioned arguments 46 that, even if a multitude of string scenarios exists, 45 According to Susskind, these tunneling processes are unavoidable.
The vacua in string theory with lambda > 0 are not stable and decay on a time scale smaller than the recurrence time. (Susskind 2003, p. 17). 46 Cf. Banks (2002) ; Banks (2003) and Banks (2004) . See above. According to Banks, the postulated scenarios forming the landscape are not to be seen as solutions to the same theory, that would not mean that there are dynamical transitions between these scenarios.
For the idea of an anthropic selection in string theory this would make impossible any escape route from the strong realism with regard to empirically inaccessible worlds.
Consequences
Whatever might happen to string theory and to its landscape hypothesis: introducing anthropic reasoning into physics leads to a severe modication of our conception of science and its relation to reality. Not only that the traditional requirements for our most fundamental theories are changing:
[...] in an anthropic theory simplicity and elegance are not considerations. The only criteria for choosing a vacuum is utility, i.e. does it have the necessary elements such as galaxy formation and complex chemistry that are needed for life. (Susskind 2003, pp. 5) .
Anthropic reasoning touches one of the traditionally central goals of physics. As Steven Weinberg wrote long ago:
After all, we do not want merely to describe the world as we nd it, but to explain to the greatest possible extent why it has to be the way it is. Weinberg 1977, p. 34) .
If an ensemble scenario, without an intrinsic, intratheoretically motivated selection principle, leading to the idea of anthropic selection, should turn out to be unavoidable, this would probably be the end of a purely physical answer to Weinberg's question, why the world is as it is. We would possibly be able to nd out to a certain degree how the world is. But the way it is would not be exclusively subject to a physical, but to a cosmological or to an evolutionary explanation, reecting its contingency. -But this might depict things exactly as they are. If we are not too fond of the metaphysical ideals of unambiguity and uniqueness, but, if at all, as completely independent theoretical scenarios. But, if the string scenarios within the landscape are not solutions of a common theoretical framework, the idea that there could be dynamical transitions between them is wrong.
Unless one rejects the AdS/CFT prescription for quantum gravity in Anti de Sitter space, it is dicult to defend the idea that there is a unique theory of quantum gravity, with dierent realizations of it corresponding to minima of an eective potential. This eld theory inspired picture is based on a separation between UV and IR physics which is simply not there in theories of quantum gravity. I have tried to investigate both real and virtual transitions between vacua with dierent values of the cosmological constant, or isolated vacua with the same values of the cosmological constant and found that they do not occurblack holes get in the way. (Banks 2003, p. 76) . But, if the landscape hypothesis turns out to be a necessary implication of string theory, this is very probably the only way in which a falsication of string theory will be achievable. Otherwise it can not be falsied, because, as Lee Smolin points out, the idea that the selection of a vacuum from the string landscape should be understood as an anthropic eect leads very easily to the following self-immunization: 'Our theory has many solutions S i . One of them, S 1 gives rise to a prediction X. If X is found that will conrm the combination of our theory and the particular solution S 1 . But if X is not found belief in the theory is not diminished, for there are a large number of solutions that don't predict X. ' (Smolin 2004, p. 5) .
Has string theory, with the landscape hypothesis and with its understanding of the selection as an anthropic eect, already reached the stage of this selfimmunization?
47 As long as it is not possible to derive the concrete low energy implications from the theory, it is simply undecidable, anyway, if a certain scenario is anthropically suitable. But, even if the low energy physics could be derived for all relevant scenarios, it would probably remain undecidable to a certain degree which scenarios permit complex organisms with epistemic potential, because the conditions for intelligent life are to a large degree unknown.
[...] I do not know how to implement the anthropic principle. It is nearly impossible to say: the weak anthropic principle (the requirement that we nd ourselves in an environment or neighborhood which can support life) requires the cosmological constant to be..., the ne structure constant to be..., the strength of inationary uctuation to be... The problem is simply too complicated. (Dine 2004b, p. 8) .
It is likely that the low energy dynamics of any theory satisfying our criteria would be suciently complicated that we would have little chance of deciding whether complex, intelligent organisms could evolve in these alternative universes. (Banks 2003, p. 55). It is indeed plausible that this is already the case with string theory [...] . (Smolin 2004, p. 5) .
If anthropic selectivity dominates completely the relation between a theory and the observable phenomenology, one obviously does not have to know much about the fundamental theory, except that it includes, anyhow, with a probability above zero, anthropically suitable solutions.
Perhaps the most attractive feature of the anthropic argument is that it does not require us to know much about the Meta-theory, which determines the probability distribution of the cosmological constant.
One requires only that such a theory exists and that the probability distribution in the vicinity of the anthropic bound is nonzero, and reasonably smooth. The lack of dependence on details of the Metatheory is important, because it is unlikely that any of those details could be checked by experiment. If we needed to understand an elaborate mathematical theory, most of whose structure could never be tested, in order to believe in the anthropic bound, then that bound would appear much less plausible. (Banks 2003, pp. 46) .
Given a theory with anthropically suitable solutions, a theory which could describe the fundamental nomology of our world, the suspicion always remains, as long as there are no independent empirical tests, that there could be other theories with the same virtues, but postulating completely dierent fundamental nomologies.
I must admit to a great deal of unease in talking about these arguments. Consider the following model of a Meta-theory: A supreme being plays dice with himself, and on the basis of each throw, decides to construct a universe with a nite number of quantum states obeying the famous, yet to be constructed, rules for quantum cosmology in such a universe. Only the number of spins n is decided by the throw of the dice. We then apply the anthropic argument. As theoretical physicists, we would certainly nd an elegant mathematical model of a Meta-theory more satisfying than the supreme being model. But our inability to perform experiments for the values of n that are ruled out by the anthropic argument, leaves us with no experimental proof that the supreme being model is any less right than the mathematical one. We must ask ourselves whether we are really doing science. So must anyone who indulges in anthropic speculation. (Banks 2003, p. 48 ).
How could we ever trust in such a theory as a fundamental description of nature?
Ensemble theories whose relevance for the observable phenomenology is mediated exclusively by anthropic selectivity can not really be falsied. This is completely unacceptable for a scientic theory: Physics and Philosophy 2006 Id: 005 The simple reason is that once a non-falsiable theory is preferred to falsiable alternatives, the process of science stops and further increases in knowledge are ruled out. (Smolin 2004, p. 5) .
So, are there alternatives to anthropic reasoning with regard to the selection of scenarios from the string landscape, or to the string landscape itself, or even to string theory? Or is this simply the end?
